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General and complete disarmament

Nuclear disarmament

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*

Reducing nuclear danger

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/62/150.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to requests contained in resolutions 61/78, 61/83 and 61/85.

2. In paragraph 22 of its resolution 61/78, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, at its sixty-second session, a report on the implementation of the resolution.

3. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 61/83, the General Assembly requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken on the implementation of the resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requested the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its sixty-second session.

4. In paragraph 5 of its resolution 61/85, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (see A/56/400) that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war and to continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus in favour of holding an international conference, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session.

II. Observations

5. International efforts to address the threats posed by nuclear weapons have long embodied two basic approaches that are often pursued together: disarmament, aiming at the elimination of such weapons, and arms control, involving various measures to reduce their risks. General Assembly resolutions 61/78 and 61/83 specifically focus on the goal of elimination, while Assembly resolution 61/85 reflects many of the traditional priorities of nuclear arms control.

6. While acknowledging the interrelationship between disarmament and non-proliferation, General Assembly resolution 61/78 contains a list of specific steps needed to achieve nuclear disarmament, including establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones; diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; halting qualitative improvements; de-alerting; developing legally binding nuclear security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; commencing negotiations on deep reductions of nuclear arsenals; underlining the principle of irreversibility; reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons; negotiating a fissile material treaty with verification and calling for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; negotiating in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament; and calling for an international conference on nuclear disarmament and the effective implementation of the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

7. In recent years, the world has witnessed progress in some areas. According to some assessments, the total number of nuclear weapons existing today — reportedly around 27,000 — is at its lowest level in four decades. Many weapons are

reportedly being moved from operational to reserve status. Talks are under way on reductions to follow the expiration in 2009 of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States. The nuclear-weapon States are maintaining their voluntary moratoria on nuclear tests and there has been only one such test — by a non-nuclear-weapon State — since 1998. Some nuclear-weapon States have closed their nuclear test sites. The nuclear-weapon States have reportedly stopped producing fissile material for use in weapons. Some of these States have announced the retirement of certain categories of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

8. Yet many challenges remain, especially with respect to transparency, irreversibility and verification of stocks of nuclear weapons and their reductions. The precise number of nuclear weapons or quantities of fissile material in weapons programmes remains undisclosed and falls short of expectations for deeper reductions. Past reductions have only been declared but not independently verified. States that possess nuclear weapons are still developing delivery vehicles and, in some cases, also improving their warheads or increasing their reliability over extended periods. Such States continue to consider such weapons as essential or vital to their security. There has been very little progress, and some setbacks, in implementing the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is still not in force. Having celebrated the tenth anniversary of its opening for signature in September 2006, the Treaty has now been signed by 177 States, with 138 having ratified it. The fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty will be convened on 17 and 18 September 2007 in Vienna by the Secretary-General in his capacity as depositary of the Treaty, at the request of the majority of States that have ratified the Treaty. The Conference is aimed at promoting further signatures and ratification in order to enable the early entry into force of the Treaty. Persistent efforts to end the chronic stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament have yet to bear fruit, though its deliberations have shown new degrees of intensity and focus and that much common ground does exist in that body. In his message to the Conference on 22 January, the Secretary-General stressed that the expansion of nuclear arsenals must be prevented and the reduction of existing nuclear weapons be accelerated. He further underlined that agreement on a treaty on fissile material for the use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices would be a prerequisite for sustainable nuclear disarmament.

9. Proliferation threats persist. Three States have announced their acquisition of nuclear weapons since May 1998. The Non-Proliferation Treaty still falls short of universal membership and several States parties have not yet concluded their safeguards agreements required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nor adopted the Additional Protocol. Diplomatic efforts are continuing to achieve the full compliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007). The international community has welcomed the decisions this year by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to shut down several nuclear facilities and to allow the return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, as additional efforts are under way in the six-party talks to implement fully the terms of the joint statement of 19 September 2005 and the agreement of 13 February 2007. The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was held in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2007. Despite a delay in the adoption of the agenda at the first session, the

Preparatory Committee made an encouraging start to the review cycle for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. In his message at the opening of the session the Secretary-General characterized the current situation as a persisting crisis of confidence in the Treaty. He stressed that the Treaty was worth reinforcing, stating that it had done far more than create a norm for nuclear non-proliferation. It commits the nuclear-weapon States to disarmament, while reaffirming the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, consistent with other treaty obligations. Despite proliferation concerns, the vast majority of States are not seeking such weapons and the international community is pursuing instead their total elimination.

10. There is growing concern about the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons by non-State actors, a primary focus of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and resolution 1673 (2006). Through its programme of work, the 1540 Committee has continued its efforts to promote implementation of those resolutions. Furthermore, the United Nations launched its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in September 2006, while the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/290, entered into force on 7 July 2007.

11. As stated above, despite progress, challenges in disarmament and non-proliferation remain. The Secretary-General has promoted efforts to reduce nuclear dangers in several messages and statements before bodies of the United Nations disarmament machinery, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. He further demonstrated his personal commitment by proposing to revitalize the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda through the establishment of the Office for Disarmament Affairs led by a High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

III. Information received from Governments

12. As regards General Assembly resolution 61/83, all Member States were invited, via a note verbale dated 16 February 2007, to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken with regard to the implementation of the resolution. To date, replies have been received from Chile, Cuba, Lebanon and Mexico, the texts of which are reproduced below. Additional replies received from Member States will be issued as addenda to the present report.

Chile

[Original: Spanish]
[13 June 2007]

1. Chile welcomed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice issued in 1996 which gave an interpretation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the obligation to negotiate in good faith on complete nuclear disarmament.

2. Although the 1995 Review Conference achieved the indefinite extension of the Treaty, Chile, together with the majority of countries that are not nuclear Powers,

considers that this extension can in no way be interpreted as legitimizing indefinite possession of this type of weapon by the nuclear Powers. On the contrary, it considers that the central objective of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is precisely their elimination.

3. The negotiations provided for in this article are required of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States which may suffer the consequences of their use. Our country once again reiterated this view during the 2005 Review Conference.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[16 May 2007]

1. Cuba notes with great concern that although this year marks the eleventh anniversary of the historic 8 July 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, humankind still lives under the threat of destruction by an immense arsenal of nuclear weapons.

2. The prospects remain discouraging. A few nuclear-weapon States still refuse to renounce the use of nuclear weapons as part of their military doctrines. And, worse yet, the authorities of one of them, the United States of America, has stated that it may use them even against non-nuclear-weapon States in response to attacks using non-nuclear weapons.

3. This lack of progress means that the views that the Government of the Republic of Cuba conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to resolution 60/76, published in the report of the Secretary-General of 10 July 2006 (A/61/127), remain entirely valid.

4. Nevertheless, Cuba wishes to reiterate that the use of nuclear weapons is completely immoral and cannot be justified by any concept or doctrine of security. It is indeed shameful that nuclear weapons still exist and that new and more sophisticated ones, which pose a serious threat to all humanity, continue to be developed.

5. Cuba stresses that the use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequences for all known forms of life on Earth. Their use would, moreover, constitute a flagrant violation of international standards on the prevention of genocide. Not only should the international community not forget the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a world free of such lethal weapons but it should also insist on compliance with the commitment to achieve it.

6. Notwithstanding the proclaimed end of the cold war, there are some 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, over 12,000 of which are ready for immediate use. Nuclear weapons upgrading programmes have not been halted.

7. For non-nuclear-weapon States that are also parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this situation gives cause for serious concern. They are being threatened with the use of nuclear weapons in flagrant violation of the assurances given by the nuclear Powers at the time of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

8. The nuclear-weapon States have a legal obligation not only to pursue, but also to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international verification.

9. Furthermore, some of the nuclear Powers hypocritically limit the nuclear problem to the issue of non-proliferation, to the detriment of nuclear disarmament, while they themselves are updating their nuclear arsenals in what amounts to vertical proliferation.

10. Cuba reiterates that nuclear non-proliferation, while important, is not an end in itself but rather a means of achieving the ultimate, supreme goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It also stresses that the total elimination of such weapons is the only sure way to avoiding disaster as a result of their use. The current nuclear weapons, which are thousands of times more powerful than the bombs that the United States of America used against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would cause destruction and genocide immensely greater than those of 1945.

11. The international community's multilateral mechanisms and instruments for addressing issues related to disarmament and arms control are being prevented from achieving their goals. This is shown by the failure of the 2005 World Summit, where a lack of consensus meant that the Outcome Document could not include a reference to disarmament; the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to open urgent negotiations on a phased disarmament programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

12. In September 2006, Cuba had the honour of presiding over the Fourteenth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana, at which political leaders confirmed that nuclear disarmament is a top priority with respect to disarmament and arms control and reaffirmed the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

13. Cuba is a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the international treaties on chemical and biological weapons. In the United Nations General Assembly, Cuba supports resolutions that advocate the total elimination of nuclear weapons, such as resolution 61/78 on nuclear disarmament and resolution 61/97 on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons.

14. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Cuba is also in favour of giving priority to commencing negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and has been among the sponsors of concrete initiatives developed by the Group of 21 for that purpose. This position in favour of nuclear disarmament extends to Cuba's participation in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, where it has joined the other countries members of the Non-Aligned Movement during the latter's 2007 meetings in proposing a set of recommendations aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament.

15. Specifically, the recommendations submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission also show how the members of the Non-Aligned

Movement, including Cuba, are acting in a manner consistent with the aims and purposes of General Assembly resolution 61/83.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[1 May 2007]

With reference to the aforementioned issue, the Ministry of National Defence points out that by letter dated 5 July 2003 concerning resolution 57/85 on follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. Lebanon reaffirms that it abides by United Nations resolutions on that subject, does not possess weapons of mass destruction and is opposed to the threat or use of such weapons.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[3 April 2007]

1. Mexico believes that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is historic because it reaffirms the existence of a legal obligation of States parties to pursue negotiations in good faith leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

2. Almost 11 years after this opinion was issued, Mexico considers that it remains fully in force, and calls attention to the grave danger that nuclear weapons represent, reiterating that their use is prohibited inasmuch as it is a violation of international law applicable to armed conflict and of the principles and norms of international humanitarian law.

3. In the light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, it can be stated that nuclear weapons are inhumane and put the survival of humanity at risk; their total elimination is therefore a matter of urgency since their very existence endangers international peace and security.

4. Mexico is taking action for the elimination of nuclear weapons. At the sixty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, it sponsored a resolution with this goal together with the New Agenda group (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Switzerland) which was adopted by a majority of Member States. Furthermore, together with Australia and New Zealand, it proposed the adoption of a resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as a resolution on "United Nations study on disarmament education and non-proliferation", the "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme", and a decision on the "United Nations conference to determine appropriate means of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament".

5. It also supported agreements in the Conference on Disarmament to examine the topic of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. Mexico participated in the Ministerial Meeting held in New York on 20 September 2006 to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

6. On 11, 12 and 13 October 2006, Mexico held a "Seminar to Promote the Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the Caribbean Region" in Mexico City in coordination with the Canadian Government and with the assistance of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The representatives of 19 States in the region participating in the event stressed the need to conclude a subregional technical cooperation agreement for Central America, the Caribbean, Canada, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela in order to promote national capacities for the full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and increase cooperation between the Provisional Technical Secretariat and the region.

7. The States parties will soon embark on the preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this context will also review the compliance with the legal obligation of nuclear disarmament recognized by the Court, as noted in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part I)). The participating countries should encourage States to submit reports on the fulfilment of the goal of nuclear disarmament, and hence on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in favour of the concluding of a legal instrument which would totally and effectively prohibit nuclear weapons.

8. Mexico is concerned at the insistence on maintaining the nuclear option as an element of deterrence in the strategic doctrines and national security policies of some countries and considers that such a position is equivalent to the threat of their use, inasmuch as deterrence, in order to be effective, has its basis in the credible possibility of use of such weapons. In this context it is also urgent to promote through a legally binding instrument the granting of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States in order to prevent the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against such States.

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Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. By resolution 61/72 of 6 December 2006 on "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus", the General Assembly appealed to all interested States to determine the size and nature of their surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, whether they represent a security risk, if appropriate, their means of destruction and whether external assistance was needed to eliminate the risk. Furthermore, it encouraged States in a position to do so to assist interested States within a bilateral framework or through international or regional organizations, on a voluntary and transparent basis, in elaborating and implementing programmes to eliminate surplus stockpiles or to improve their management. The Assembly also encouraged all Member States to examine the possibility of developing and implementing, within a national, regional or subregional framework, measures to address accordingly the illicit trafficking related to the accumulation of such stockpiles. Finally, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States regarding the risks arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus and regarding national ways of strengthening controls on conventional ammunition and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session.

2. In the same resolution the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to consider, commencing no later than 2008, further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, and to transmit the report of the group of experts to the General Assembly for consideration at its sixty-third session.

3. Pursuant to the request referred to in paragraph 1 above, on 30 January 2007, the Office for Disarmament Affairs sent a note verbale to Member States requesting their views on the subject. To date, replies have been received from the following States: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, Portugal, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Spain and Turkey. Also, in its capacity as European Council Presidency, Germany submitted the views of the European Union. The replies are reproduced in section II below. The full texts of the replies received will be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, at http://disarmament.un.org/cab/Ammunition.htm. Additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Member States

Bangladesh

[Original: English]
[31 May 2007]

"1. Member States may identify and declare any stockpile of ammunition as 'surplus', if:

a. It is an addition to the Member State's security needs;

b. It is unmanageable in respect of Member State's ability of safe custody; and

c. It involves safety and security risks to humankind and environment.

2. *Risks arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus*: Surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, if inadequately manned, pose potentially significant security and safety risks. The importance of those are as follows:

a. The population and environment close to ammunition depots are at risk by such stockpiles.

b. Scattered stockpiles in the aftermath of war remain vulnerable, and pilferage from these stockpiles especially to terrorists and other criminal groups cannot be ruled out.

c. Stockpiles of ammunition that are stored in exposed places and with inappropriately equipped storage facilities may result in greater risk to communities.

d. Surplus stockpiles may jeopardize the security of the neighbouring countries thereby destabilize international peace. They also cause the risk of explosion, pollution, and diversion.

3. *National ways of strengthening control on conventional ammunition*: Some ways of strengthening control on conventional ammunition at the national level are as follows:

a. Member States should recognize that proper national control over their stockpiles of conventional ammunition is essential in order to prevent loss.

b. Member States should ensure physical security of ammunition in order to reduce the risks of pilferage, unwanted and uncontrolled proliferation.

c. If a Member State declares presence of surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, it should intimate or notify the United Nations Standing Committee as well as its neighbours.

d. Member States should agree on 'minimum standard' on preservation and safety regulations of conventional ammunition, and should ensure that their own stockpiles are subjected to proper national inventory accounting control procedures and measures.

e. Member States should ensure proper destruction of surplus stockpiles in an environment friendly manner through national monitoring system. Member States may seek technical and financial assistance of the United Nations Standing Committee in this regard.

f. Member States should provide accountability of 'surplus' stockpiles of conventional ammunition through a 'United Nations Register for Stockpiled Conventional Ammunition'.

g. Member States should undertake capacity-building programmes of national institutions to continue longer-term, safe, efficient and effective destruction of 'surplus' ammunition.

h. Member States in a position to do so should assist interested Member States to determine the risks related with their surplus stock and to develop trained manpower to deal with the surplus stock of ammunition."

Bolivia

[Original: Spanish]
[9 July 2007]

1. The production, import, reloading and general supply of all types and calibres of conventional ammunition, whether for the armed forces, the police, institutions or individuals, are very limited.

2. In the case of the armed forces, resources must be permanently managed to ensure at least that usual needs are met.

3. Supplies of sporting and hunting calibre ammunition come from imports and reloading, with permanent controls on trade and storage.

4. As Bolivia has no surplus stockpiles, there is no risk connected with the storage of conventional ammunition.

5. The absence of surplus stockpiles means there are no elimination programmes, so there is no opportunity to assist other States in this regard.

6. Bolivia's current situation means that the issue of illicit trafficking related to the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus must be addressed domestically before regional or subregional proposals are made. Accordingly, it favours adoption of the appropriate measures in the Regulations on the Weapons Act, which are close to being approved.

7. The risks attached to accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus should be viewed more from the standpoint of diversion to illicit trafficking than from the standpoint of explosion or pollution.

8. As the ultimate world voice, the United Nations is the best forum for dealing with the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus.

The General Assembly requested the establishment of a group of governmental experts to consider, commencing no later than 2008, further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, and the consideration of the experts' report at its sixty-third session. The deadline for the establishment of the group of experts is prudent and sufficient, and Bolivia hopes to have specific legislation in place by that time.

Bolivia suggests proceeding with the inclusion of the issue in the provisional agenda of the sixty-third session.

Conclusions

A. Bolivia is not exempt from the risks of accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. At the national level, the risk may be associated with the diversion of the armed forces' reserve supplies.

At the regional and subregional levels, this phenomenon is a threat to security, as Bolivia is aware of accumulations of surpluses in many neighbouring States. Mainly because of its geographical location, Bolivia could become a point of transit and consumption for illicit trafficking in those surpluses.

B. The issue must be addressed immediately, considering that Bolivia was one of the States which voted in favour of resolution 61/72 on 6 December 2006 and has planned the Regulations on the Weapons Act accordingly.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

[Original: English]
[30 April 2007]

At the moment, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina use 23 locations for keeping and storing ammunition and explosives. A total of approximately 35,000 tons of ammunition and explosive ordnance is stockpiled. The estimation is that approximately 25,000 tons of ammunition and explosive ordnance is surplus to the requirements of the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In view of the fact that the total number of military personnel was reduced by an additional 10,000 members in the last reform, the safeguarding of storage facilities by the armed service, which in reality is the sole security method used, poses a big security problem (facilities lack any additional protection systems like electronic equipment, video surveillance, etc.).

Only five perspective locations for ammunition storage have been determined by the Presidency Decision on the Strength, Structure and Locations of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to reduce the number of storage locations to the number determined by the Presidency Decision, measures must be taken to dispose of surplus Armed Forces ammunition and explosives as soon as possible.

Keeping in mind the fact that the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted documents concerning equipping the Armed Forces with basic weapons systems and military equipment, as well as training, the path is open for comprehensive plans to be designed for the future disposal of surplus weapons and ammunition.

The dynamics of designing the disposal plans will depend on solving the issue of the transfer of property ownership from entities to the State. Respecting the current situation and the priorities defined for the surplus weapons disposal process (first of all ammunition and explosives), we decided to make a disposal plan exclusively for unstable ammunition and explosives in this phase.

Furthermore, 5,745.5 tons of unstable ammunition have been identified as being in the possession of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Minister of Defence has already taken a decision on its destruction. Based on this decision, a two-year plan for the disposal of unstable ammunition has been proposed and is to be realized in cooperation with the UNDP office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Reduction Programme. We emphasize that cooperation in activities regarding the realization of the plan for the disposal of unstable ammunition is not limited to the UNDP office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is open to other international organizations present in the country and involved in this issue.

In order to improve the security level of military ammunition and comprehensive explosive storage facilities, and with the aim of finally closing

certain locations, we gave priority in 2006 to the disposal of unstable ammunition. Activities for the destruction of unstable ammunition began in the second part of 2006 and 852 tons of unstable ammunition had been destroyed at industrial facilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of 2006.

More dynamic and efficient disposal of the remaining ammunition surplus depends on the capacity of industrial facilities to demilitarize ammunition using the delaboration method. The existing capacity of these industrial facilities is limited (it is only possible to destroy approximately 2,200 tons of ammunition per year). The Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina believes that the investment of significant financial resources in industrial facilities development in order to expand their ammunition disposal capacity would reduce the risk of possible unwanted consequences from uncontrolled detonation. Once again, we emphasize that, regardless of the existing difficulties, all military storage facilities are under the full control of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus the possibility of any kind of theft or misuse is reduced to a minimum.

Czech Republic

[Original: English]
[30 April 2007]

The main risks arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus include the risks resulting from lack of control, and the risks of theft, loss, diversion, explosion and pollution. Surplus stockpiles jeopardize the security of local communities as well as neighbouring countries. Member States should assess whether parts of their national stockpiles should be considered to be in surplus.

Member States' ammunition stockpiles should be commensurate with the Member States' legitimate security needs. The appropriate controls should be in place, including a national supervision and inspection system as well as quality and quantity monitoring. The army, police and other armed services should have in place internal standards governing the acquisition and disposal of ammunition. For example, when considering the procurement of new ammunition, the Police should take into account its current operational needs and the condition and age of its existing ammunition stockpiles.

Stockpiles of ammunition and explosives should be regularly inspected and particular attention should be paid to their size and compliance with security and safety regulations. The inspections should be carried out according to approved schedules, and whenever there are any indications of diversion. Any shortcomings found by the inspectors should be immediately eliminated. Observance of laws and regulations should minimize the risk of explosion, pollution or diversion.

Member States should determine the size and nature of surplus stockpiles, whether they represent a security risk, their nature of destruction, and whether external assistance is needed to eliminate the risk. Ammunition requirements should be regularly reviewed, taking into account the service life of the ammunition and the conditions of storage. The ammunition should be regularly tested and inspected to determine appropriate disposal or treatment options. Member States should dispose of ammunition, which is in surplus or unfit for use in an environment-friendly manner. Environment-friendly destruction of surplus ammunition should be an

ongoing process; for example, whenever a weapon or weapon system is taken out of service with the armed forces, its ammunition should be disposed of as well. Member States should duly supervise the disposal of surplus stockpiles of ammunition. The destruction of any ammunition, especially chemical ammunition, should be carried out by authorized experts.

A programme to eliminate surplus stockpiles or to improve their management should be part of an overall efficient stockpile management policy. Stocks should be inspected frequently and carefully and reduced according to the current operational needs. Any surplus stock should be physically destroyed. Only ammunition that is really necessary and meets all standards, namely in terms of age and technical fitness, should be retained.

Member States in a position to do so should assist interested States in elaborating and implementing programmes to eliminate surplus stockpiles or to improve their management.

Member States in a position to do so should assist other countries in developing programmes to eliminate surplus stockpiles, to determine the risks related to their stock in surplus or to improve their management.

Member States should examine the possibility of developing and implementing within a national, regional or subregional framework, measures to address the illicit trafficking related to the accumulation of surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition.

To prevent the hoarding of and illicit trading in ammunition originating from surplus stocks, Member States should strictly enforce the internal standards, laws and regulations applicable to acquisition and disposal of equipment, consistently supervise any transactions involving police equipment and apply tight sanctions for violators. Member States should keep track of any ammunition originating from surplus stocks, in order to prevent illicit trafficking.

Germany[1]

[Original: English]
[26 April 2007]

On 6 December 2006 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 61/72 entitled "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus" which had been tabled by France and Germany.

A. Risks arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus

Germany is convinced that the problems caused by ammunition stockpiles in surplus in all their aspects deserve the urgent attention of the international community. Deficient administration and insufficient security of public ammunition stockpiles worldwide represent a major source of illegal ammunition transfer. At the same time, aged and insufficiently secured stockpiles endanger both the civilian population and the environment.

[1] Germany's full report can be viewed at www.new-york-un.diplo.de/.

Combined with conventional weapons from which it is fired, ammunition plays a decisive role in the escalation and prolongation of armed conflicts between States and within States, as well as in the spread of organized crime. Explosives and ammunition are also increasingly being used in unconventional explosive and incendiary devices which pose a serious danger to the civilian population, including to civilian aid workers, as well as to soldiers in peacekeeping missions. Huge ammunition stockpiles, the continuing high rate of production, and the increase in illicit trade lead to a complex source of significant security risks which are not limited to certain locations or regions but which assume a global dimension due to international terrorism and transnational organized crime.

B. National ways of strengthening controls on conventional ammunition

Germany's ammunition stockpiles fall under the responsibility of the Federal Ministries of Defence (Federal Armed Forces), the Interior (police forces) and Finance (customs administration). The following rules and procedures apply to the Federal Armed Forces; equally strict provisions govern ammunition held under the responsibility of other official bodies. Details are described in the full version of this report (footnote 1).

Ammunition stocks are calculated on the basis of operational need and expenditure rates. Ammunition is normally traced using IT-databases from the time it leaves the factory to the time of use or disposal. It is stored in specially constructed and secured depots. Ammunition found to be in surplus is destroyed as a matter of principle.

The operational requirements for ammunition used in the Federal Armed Forces are calculated on the basis of expenditure rates, proceeding from the maximum simultaneous force posture for a given operation and the kind of operation.

Ammunition is verified during its entire lifetime so that it can be traced from leaving the factory to use or disposal. It is stored in Federal Armed Forces depots with "igloos" (storehouses covered with earth) which are checked regularly by military security personnel. Its transport, loading and unloading is subject to special security measures.

The dangers posed by ammunition and handling risks are recognized through threat assessments and risk analyses and assessments. Exact knowledge of the chemical and physical effects of intended or unintended detonation of ammunition is used to calculate these risks and to develop corresponding protection measures. Scientific and technical issues are discussed and coordinated within NATO's "Ammunition Safety Group". Guidelines and standards produced there form the basis of the Federal Armed Forces' security standards and infrastructure guidelines.

Ammunition found to be surplus as a result of the requirements assessment is taken out of service using IT-based procedures and transferred to the Armed Forces Defence Technology and Procurement Administration (BWB) for disposal. The destruction of surplus or unusable ammunition is usually carried out by commercial firms. Destruction takes place immediately after the end of the process of removal from service and transfer of responsibility to the armaments industry. Contracts for ammunition destruction are awarded under a "negotiated competitive procedure". The call for tender does not contain guidelines for the method of destruction. The firms propose a concept oriented towards their infrastructure; this concept is

examined by the BWB and, when approved, a contract is concluded. In Germany there are sufficient firms able to destroy the full spectrum of ammunition in an economical and environmentally sound way. For each type of ammunition there are several firms able to destroy it in accordance with the relevant regulations.

Ammunition is basically not reused. Only in rare exceptional cases is small-calibre ammunition sold to friendly nations or transferred to national producers for recycling, e.g. as exercise ammunition.

C. *Germany's contribution to international efforts in ammunition administration and storage*

Germany's bilateral and multilateral engagement aims at assisting partners to effectively improve ammunition administration and storage and to reduce ammunition stockpiles, above all in order to counter the related danger of illegal transfer.

Germany's efforts within the United Nations are aimed at anchoring the topic of ammunition and ammunition stockpiling on the international agenda, thus contributing to the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, including by tabling, in 2005 and 2006, the resolution entitled "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus" in the United Nations General Assembly.

Germany's efforts within the OSCE have focused on the establishment of best practice guidelines[2] on issues such as "transporting conventional ammunitions by land" and "marking, record-keeping and traceability of conventional ammunition".

Germany also plays an active role in multinational seminars, symposia, workshops and other events promoting international discussion and conceptual development in the fields of ammunition storage, transport, use and management.[3]

Germany (on behalf of the European Union)

[Original: English]
[2 May 2007]

The member States of the European Union have consistently paid due attention to the issue of ammunition. This is particularly true with regard to the EU's positions taken in the context of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The EU's Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition which was endorsed by its Council of Ministers in December 2005 inter alia underlines the importance of addressing the issue of ammunition. At the same time it promotes close international cooperation with regard to the management and security of stockpiles of conventional arms and ammunition:

[2] OSCE Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security FSK.GAL/14/03/Rev.2 of 19 September 2003.

[3] See the study entitled "Targeting Ammunition — A Primer", published by *Small Arms Survey*, Geneva 2006, funded by Germany (www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/b_series2.html).

15. ..., the challenge for an EU strategy on SALW is to respond to these threats and to ensure that its security policy and its development policy are consistent, while fully exploiting the means available to it at multilateral and regional levels, within the European Union and in the EU's bilateral relations in order to frame an action plan which will:

(a) Foster effective multilateralism so as to forge mechanisms, whether international, regional or within the EU and it Member States, for countering the supply and destabilizing the spread of SALW and their ammunition. The Union must strengthen its export control policies and activities in coordination with its partners;

(b) Meet requests by States seeking to reduce their surplus stocks of SALW and their ammunition, either under a stockpile reduction policy or by participating in DDR operations.

Arms and ammunition

International efforts to control the effects of trafficking, proliferation and misuse of arms have generally not paid the same attention to the issue of ammunition. Arms have often been disassociated from their ammunition. In particular with regard to small arms and light weapons, a number of important agreements have been adopted in recent years, while the issue of their ammunition has often been neglected. This is particularly true for the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. However, when this Instrument was considered by the United Nations Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons its report A/60/88 of 27 June 2005 recommended to specifically address the issue of ammunition:

27. The Working Group recommends that the issue of small arms and light weapons ammunition be addressed in a comprehensive manner as part of a separate process conducted within the framework of the United Nations.

Ammunition stockpiles

Massive quantities of ammunition are held in insecure locations at considerable risk of loss, capture or diversion. These quantities of ammunition contribute to the risks of trafficking and proliferation and to the prolongations and intensification of armed conflict. At the same time, recent incidents at ammunition storage depots illustrate the resulting threat to security, health and the environment. Safe handling of ammunition poses specific requirements, since they contain explosive materials. Safe destruction of ammunition requires specialist skills and facilities. While different types of conventional ammunition, munitions or explosives have different requirements, the basic issues, priorities and skills required to promote the management and security of stockpiles are similar for most categories of concern: munitions for major conventional arms, SALW ammunition, bombs, IEDs, unexploded ordnance.

Many of the insecure and unsafe ammunition stockpiles are surplus stocks. This applies to military stockpiles, but also to the quantities of ammunition held by police and other agencies. The individual State needs to define surplus stockpiles and take a decision on how to deal with them. Stockpiles needed for national security purposes are to be separated from stockpiles that are insecure or in surplus.

Stockpiles needed for national security purposes need to be safely stored; stockpiles that are insecure and in surplus must be destroyed.

Guidelines and principles

Guidance documents on management and security of stockpiles of conventional ammunition are essential, also as a prerequisite for international assistance. The Member States of the European Union have endorsed such documents in the institutional frame of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition FSC.Doc 11/03 of 17 November 2003 and the ongoing work on a Best Practice Guides on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition deserve to be mentioned. However, no such best practice guidelines have been developed and endorsed at the global level.

International cooperation

International efforts with regard to the management and security of arms and ammunition stockpiles have increased recently. However, in comparison to the urgency of the problem posed by ammunition stockpiles, the scale of such cooperation appears to be limited. Due to the nature of ammunition, specific resources and cooperation programmes are required, so that surplus ammunition can be destroyed in a rapid, safe and transparent way. Training, advice on infrastructure improvements, advice on technical and administrative measures as well as record-keeping are key elements of such cooperation. The scale of the problem of insecure and unsafe ammunition stockpiles is so urgent that efforts to promote good practice need to be complemented by programmes which address the greatest risks on an emergency basis.

Group of Governmental Experts

In order for the Group of Governmental Experts to address the above issues in a convincing and comprehensive manner, the Expert Group needs to take a broad look at the issues related to ammunition as well as the management and security of their stockpiles. Such a wide approach, considering past work and progress made in other forums, would allow the Group to make a meaningful contribution to addressing the dangers resulting from ineffective and inefficient management and security of stockpiles of conventional ammunition.

Guatemala

[Original: Spanish]
[14 May 2007]

The Ministry of Defence has provided the following information on the steps that it has taken in order to prevent the existence of conventional ammunition in surplus:

1. The Chief of Defence Staff has issued an Obsolete Materiel Destruction Plan (covering explosives and ammunition), which establishes procedures for the destruction of obsolete materiel contained in the various arsenals of the Republic's military commands, including its decommissioning and destruction in accordance

with the specific plans of that Service; this is now being handled by the War Materials Service in cooperation with the Army Corps of Engineers.

2. This Plan will be implemented in three phases: (a) Phase 1: inspection and classification of obsolete hazardous materiel; (b) Phase 2: Transport of the explosives and destruction in the appropriate area; (c) Phase 3: Decommissioning of the ammunition.

With respect to national measures to strengthen controls of conventional arms, the following proposal is hereby submitted for possible adoption by States:

1. Establish monitoring measures in order to ensure traceability; this is the approach taken by the international ammunition trade with a view to the registration and monitoring of conventional ammunition from the manufacturer to the end-user through adequate marking of both the secondary packaging (packages and boxes) and the base of the cartridges; an appropriate, internationally recognized code, such as the following, would be established:

(a) On the secondary packaging: class, calibre, identification of the manufacturer, brand of ammunition, lot number, date of manufacture and country of origin; and

(b) On the base of the cartridge: the calibre, date and country of origin;

2. Monitor the national defence industry's compliance regarding marking of the ammunition produced in order to establish adequate control over the type and quantity of ammunition circulating in the national territory; and

3. Develop regulations, consistent with existing international controls, governing the minimum and maximum quantity of ammunition that can be exported or imported by physical and legal persons.

Hungary

[Original: English]
[17 April 2007]

The Republic of Hungary, like many other European countries, has accomplished a significant reduction of armed forces in the last decades. This process resulted in a large amount of surplus ammunition. Marketability of these materials, due to strict international regulations, is limited, as is the available military storage potential. The only feasible solution is to dispose of these ammunition surpluses using national means and capabilities in a controlled and safe manner.

From 2000 onwards, the disposal of redundant ammunition in Hungary was carried out within the military, but this process proved to be slow due to the limited capabilities. In 2004 a decision was made to involve the civilian industrial potential in this process: two national firms have taken over the disposal, using contemporary technology. They are responsible for the safe disassembly and destruction of ammunition surpluses at a rate of 8-10 thousand tons per year, taking into consideration the most recent and strict rules of environmental protection.

The cost of the disposal process is covered in the defence budget.

Japan

[Original: English]
[17 May 2007]

- The risks arising from accumulating conventional ammunition stockpiles depend mainly on their volume and the ways of management. Japan has detailed ammunition management systems as well as small arms and light weapons, and the practical measures are: to have laid down licensing systems for manufacturing and importing arms and explosives, and to strictly control these activities, and to punish people in its territory who violate these restrictions.
- Stocks of SALW held by the Self-Defence Forces and the Police are strictly controlled including their storage and inspection. In addition, old SALW and those impossible to repair are disposed of under close scrutiny and strict procedures.
- Japan participated in the Workshop "Stockpile Security of Small Arms and Light Weapons including Manpads", jointly organized by ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), Thailand, and Australia in October 2006, and introduced its experience of stockpile management gained through small arms collection projects in Cambodia.
- As for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition, in addition to rule-making efforts such as best practices, the process of implementing internationally common rules, perhaps through assistance projects, is indispensable. Furthermore, building the relationship of trust between donors and recipients created and solidified through projects is needed.
- When discussions are held on the international cooperation in the field of stockpile management for ammunition, it is necessary for the people with the experience and know-how of projects on the ground to join those discussions.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[17 April 2007]

The Ministry would like to point out that it is not in possession of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus and that there is no danger of this occurring. The Ministry would also like to underline that Lebanese laws and regulations provide adequate national controls to ensure the security, safety and management of conventional ammunition stockpiles in order to eliminate the risk of explosion, pollution or diversion of those stockpiles.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[30 April 2007]

In accordance with national and international norms concerning ammunition-related activities, for reasons of security, budget and the environment, Mexico has

no surplus conventional ammunition; its inventories contain only the quantities strictly necessary to their assigned functions.

Mexico considers that surplus ammunition is an inseparable part of the larger problem of the accumulation, transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The accumulation of conventional ammunition in surplus makes it possible for this type of war material to be diverted for use by criminals and criminal gangs, encouraging crime and undue violence.

The existing marking systems are too diverse for effective tracing and monitoring. Mexico has therefore stressed the importance of the proposal that manufacturers should be required to mark cartridges in a clear, secure and easily recognizable manner using an alphanumeric code, agreed among States, that indicates the manufacturer, country of origin, code and year of production, series/lot number, exact type of ammunition and any other characteristic that will allow it to be traced in order to identify the seller and buyer on the basis of purchase and sale registers.

This process should include the prohibition of any transfer of ammunition that is not properly marked. And since, generally speaking, no such centralized registries are accessible at the national or international level, there is a need for complete, accurate manufacturers' and suppliers' registries of all ammunition that is transferred or may subsequently be retransferred from the territory of a country.

In that regard, it is extremely important to take steps to monitor the production, sale, trafficking, use and stockpiling of conventional ammunition in order to combat this problem. However, there is wide variation in the effectiveness and scope of the methods currently in use. For that reason, States which do not yet have them should implement, adopt or introduce into their legislation regulations governing the manufacture, sale, purchase, stockpiling and possession of conventional cartridges and should criminalize these activities when conducted without the permits required by law.

In Mexico, Section 4, Sole Chapter of the Federal Firearms and Explosives Act regulates and restricts possession of cartridges according to their calibre, as well as criminalizing and penalizing the manufacture, sale, possession and clandestine import or export of cartridges in the following terms:

- Anyone in possession of cartridges in quantities larger than those permitted (art. 85 quat) is punishable by:

(a) One to four years' imprisonment and a fine equivalent to 10 to 50 days' pay at minimum wage if the arms are among those covered by articles 9, 10 and 11 (a) and (b) of the Act; and

(b) Two to six years' imprisonment and a fine equivalent to 25 to 100 days' pay at minimum wage if the arms are among those covered by the remaining paragraphs of article 11 of the Act.

- Anyone involved in smuggling into the national territory ammunition that is intended for the exclusive use of retired, reserve or active duty members of the Army, Navy or Air Force is subject to 5 to 30 years' imprisonment and fines equivalent to 20 to 500 days' pay at minimum wage (art. 84).

- The penalties mentioned in articles 83 quat and 84 are increased by half if the guilty party is a current or former public servant employed by any department

of the police, by a private security firm or as a retired, reserve or active duty member of the Army, Navy or Air Force (art. 84 ter).

- Anyone who sells ammunition acquired without verification of its legal origin is subject to 2 to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine equivalent to 20 to 500 days' pay at minimum wage (art. 85).
- Anyone who manufactures or exports ammunition without the proper permit is subject to 5 to 15 years' imprisonment and a fine equivalent to 100 to 500 days' pay at minimum wage (art. 85 bis).

Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, within their respective spheres of competence, are required to supervise and work in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit to verify and, if necessary, increase customs controls at border points, ports and airports so as to safeguard security and safety and eliminate illegal trafficking, clandestine stockpiling, potential explosive hazards and pollution.

Nicaragua

[Original: Spanish]
[29 May 2007]

The Republic of Nicaragua presents no risk arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus because it uses only the conventional units for each type of armament and the operational reserves established in its national defence plans.

Portugal

[Original: English]
[16 May 2007]

Portugal recognizes the importance of effective and efficient management of ammunition stockpiles. The absence of strict security control favours illicit trafficking (especially in the context of small arms and light weapons) and consequently contributes to the escalation and prolongation of armed conflicts between and within States, as well as to the spread of terrorism and organized crime.

Furthermore ammunition stockpiles kept in unsafe conditions pose a threat to the safety and health of populations and to the environment, as demonstrated by recent incidents at ammunition storage depots.

Portugal actively participates at international forums where the issue of the security of ammunition is discussed, specifically in the United Nations and the OSCE. Portugal is fully committed to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. At the OSCE, efforts are particularly concentrated in the draft of the OSCE Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security.

At a bilateral level, Portugal is willing to provide assistance to third countries dealing with problems caused by surplus ammunition.

Portuguese military ammunition stockpiles fall under the responsibility of the Ministries of Defence (Armed Forces), Home Affairs (National Guard and Police forces) and Justice (Judiciary Police and Prison Services). Military type ammunition is acquired abroad and imported, solely by the official entities identified above or by previously authorized private companies for official end-users only, and in accordance with an International Import Certificate issued by the Ministry of Defence.

After arrival in Portugal, ammunition is transported, under escort, in accordance with the procedures established by the NATO Safety Principles for the Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives — AASTP-2 and, upon arrival at the end-user's premises, stored in accordance with the procedures established by the Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives — AASTP-1, within fenced and guarded ammunition storage areas, subject to access controls.

Ammunition quantities to be obtained and stored are calculated by the end-users as a function of their training and operational activities.

Exports of military ammunition are rare, but if they occur, exporters (the official entities identified above or previously authorized private companies) have to obtain an International Export Certificate, issued by the Ministry of Defence only after due consideration of several factors, including the eight criteria of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

Ammunition for civilian use is imported, transported, stored and, occasionally, exported only by previously authorized private companies, in accordance with the applicable national legislation and under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Surplus ammunition is, as a matter of principle, destroyed.

Portugal considers that the issues of ammunition as well as management and security of stockpiles need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner and therefore strongly supports the Group of Governmental Experts to be established in 2008.

Russian Federation

[Original: Russian]
[7 May 2007]

Significant amounts of ammunition become available every year as a result of the physical ageing and obsolescence of ammunition, the reductions made in the Russian Federation's armed forces and the implementation of a number of international agreements on the reduction and elimination of weapons.

This gives rise to a number of problems, which are mostly related to securing ammunition stockpiles against fire and explosions, ensuring their safe recycling, providing for environmental safety in the storage and recycling process and establishing conditions to minimize the seriousness of consequences should emergency situations arise.

In order to address these problems, in 2005 the Russian Federation adopted and is successfully implementing the 2005 to 2010 special federal programmes for industrial recycling of weapons and military equipment and for restructuring

stockpiles of missiles, ammunitions and explosive substances, and making their storage and operating systems safe from explosions and fire.

Measures are being carried out within the framework of these special federal programmes for the construction, reconstruction and major overhaul of ammunition storage facilities which take into account modern safety requirements in all areas. Activities are also being carried out for the practical recycling of ammunition and for the creation of the necessary productive capacity.

Senegal

[Original: French]
[27 April 2007]

At present, the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons is the only instrument that contributes to small arms control in West Africa. Thus, all acquisitions of arms and ammunition are subject to a prior request for an exemption, addressed to the Executive Secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The exemption will be granted if there is no objection from member States.

In accordance with the recommendations of ECOWAS, a National Commission, established in 2000, is responsible, inter alia, for defining effective strategies to combat the illegal proliferation and circulation of small arms and light weapons. Once ratified, the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, signed on 14 June 2006, will eventually replace the Moratorium.

Senegal has no conventional ammunition in surplus.

Serbia

[Original: English]
[30 April 2007]

Different-type ammunition stockpiles in surplus, property of the Army, Air Force and Air Defence of Serbia, amount to 23,859 tons. Due to insufficient storage space, 9,640 tons of these quantities are stored in open-air facilities; they are a burden to military storage capacities and represent security and other risks. In pursuance of the needs of the armed forces of Serbia, groups "D", "E" and "F" of surplus ammunition (without a propellant charge, without a primer and with a solid propellant charge) have been identified in the amount of 23,149 tons, as well as group "G" (smoke and illumination projectiles) in the amount of 710 tons.

To identify the risks and improve safe storage of explosives and surplus ammunition, the armed forces of Serbia use the globally harmonized system of classification of the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals.

With respect to the prevalent risk types, the surplus ammunition and explosives in the armed forces of Serbia have been classified into risk class 1. For the purpose of storage and transportation, a risk class is divided into 5 risk groups

and 12 compatibility groups according to the expected risks in case of an accident. The accumulation of stockpiles and the lack of quality storage facilities account for the presence of risk group 1.1 (air wave strikes, high-velocity fragments and heat effect) and group 1.2 (dispersion of heavy and light fragments and incendiary or unexploded shrapnel that may explode at the point of subsequent impact).

The basic problem is a rundown storage infrastructure, lack of electronic facility protection and storage process monitoring and the shortage of maintenance funds. All ammunition and explosives, whether surplus or aged, likely or unlikely to be used, require the same treatment in respect of condition monitoring: technical inspection, powder and rocket fuel chemical stability examination and monitoring, test shooting and the elimination from the defence system altogether. Proper surplus ammunition maintenance is an additional financial burden and there exists no technological process of safe ammunition delaboration and no equipment and technological lines for "G" group ammunition in the armed forces of Serbia.

In order to reduce and eliminate accidents, environment pollution and sabotage risks, the armed forces of Serbia address the problem of surplus ammunition through delaboration, destruction or sale through authorized agents. The related problems have been presented within the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, with the aim of ensuring donations for the purchase or design of technology, construction and equipment of facilities for environment-friendly delaboration of ammunition containing phosphorus and hexachloroethane "G"-group mixtures and for the destruction of group "D", "E" and "F" ammunition.

To streamline the existing, or build and equip new facilities for the destruction of special ammunition stockpiles in surplus in the armed forces of Serbia from group "G", as well as those from groups "D", "E" and "F", Serbia would appreciate if appropriate donation requests were made through relevant international organizations.

Spain

[Original: Spanish]
[11 May 2007]

1. The risks arising from the accumulation of stockpiles of ammunition in surplus

The problems can be considered from two points of view: (a) those arising from ensuring the physical security of the magazines or storage sites for ammunition and the ammunition itself; (b) those arising from the possible diversion of excess production that is not used.

The accumulation of conventional ammunition in surplus is closely linked to the earlier processes of manufacture, storage and authorization to acquire ammunition. The use of firearms to commit criminal acts and, therefore, the possession of ammunition for the commission of such acts, should be seen not as a consequence of the accumulation of ammunition in surplus in general terms, but as a consequence of over-generous regulations regarding the amount of ammunition that holders of different weapons licences are authorized to store. In some circumstances, such regulations may encourage the diversion of ammunition in storage (and, therefore, legally held) to criminal sectors. In certain countries or geographical areas that are not subject to effective intervention and control, it may

also encourage diversion to criminal circles or the clandestine supplying of other conflict areas. Additional inspections are therefore needed to verify compliance with the limits established. On the other hand, it has been noted that imposing the same limits on the amount of ammunition that can be acquired and stored by devotees of Olympic shooting has encouraged the practice of illegally reloading ammunition. The manufacture of "home-made" ammunition, through unauthorized reloading, is probably the main way in which ammunition enters the black market. It also encourages another criminal activity, that of trafficking in the explosive substances (powder and percussion caps) needed to make such ammunition. In the case of Spain, such trafficking usually takes the form of smuggling such substances from neighbouring countries.

At the international level, close attention should be paid to the work and development of the future group of governmental experts which will consider further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus and the negotiation of a future international arms trade treaty, which should certainly refer to the issue of ammunition.

2. National measures to strengthen controls on conventional ammunition

2.1 Administrative control

Regulation is needed for the requirements and conditions of manufacture, circulation, storage, trading and possession of ammunition and control of the entire commercial process for ammunition (manufacture, storage, distribution and use).

2.2 Warehousing and storage

Specific regulations are needed for warehousing in order to cover: gunsmith's shops, security companies, target ranges, shooting galleries and companies specializing in the safe keeping of firearms, private individuals, target-shooting and hunting. Different security measures are required for each type of warehousing, with a complete listing of the cases in which storage is authorized and the various cases in which the manufacture of ammunition is permitted, establishing specific restrictions for such cases. The aim is to make storage sites secure and prevent the accumulation of ammunition in surplus in authorized storage sites by limiting the amount of ammunition that can be possessed or stored (distinguishing between metallic and non-metallic cartridges) and limiting the amount of ammunition that can be acquired and the amount that can be placed in storage.

2.3 Diversion

It is essential to adopt national measures to strengthen controls on the export of conventional ammunition as defence materiel. There should be an administrative body responsible for granting, where appropriate, administrative authorizations for import and export license applications by companies or private individuals for items subject to control. It is also desirable to extend the controls to include all types of firearms (including all firearms for hunting and target-shooting, their components and ammunition).

Turkey

[Original: English]
[22 June 2007]

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a regional organization which Turkey is a member, has taken concrete steps with regard to problems arising from accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. The document adopted at the 407th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum on 19 November 2003, concerning the stockpiles of conventional ammunition is a major implementation instrument for Turkey. Turkey's current national implementation with regard to conventional ammunition stockpiles is in compliance with that document, as well as with the OSCE best practices. Turkey will continue to take the required measures set out in those documents, with the understanding that any security deficiency in conventional ammunition stockpiles may not only pose a serious threat to human and environment security, but also create a situation which could be easily exploited by terrorist or organized crime groups.